nor, William C.C. Claiborne, to take possession on behalf of the United States, which he proceeded to do. ' - When Congress met in December 1810, Madison reported and defended his actions: The situation was urgent and the occupation lawful.' 6 A month later, suggesting there was a danger of British intervention in East Florida, he asked Congress to declare that the United States would not look kindly on that province's passing into the hands of another foreign power.
1 7 Congress adopted a corresponding resolution and authorized the President to occupy East Florida in the face of a foreign threat or at the behest of local authorities. ' The treaty by which Spain surrendered its remaining claims to Florida is printed at 8 Stat 252-64 (Feb 22, 1819) . Like the Louisiana treaty, it committed the United States to "incorporat[e]" the inhabitants of the territory into "the Union" and to admit them "to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities, of citizens of the United States." Id at 256-58, Art 6. It also drew the boundary between the United States and Mexico at the Sabine River-the present western border of the state of Louisiana. Id at 254-56, Art 3. This provision caused quite a stir in the House. Only a statute, not a treaty, Clay argued, could cede Texas to a foreign power; for under Article IV, Section 3 it was Congress that had authority to dispose of the territory of the United States. 36 Annals of Cong 1719 -29 (Apr 3, 1820 . Shades of the great debate over the Jay Treaty hovered over the Capitol, but the consensus seemed to be that the precedent was not on point; this was no cession of territory but the mere resolution of a boundary dispute, which was a common subject of treaties. See 36 Annals of Cong 1734 (Apr 3,1820) (Rep Lowndes); 36 Annals of Cong 1772-74 (Apr 4,1820) (Rep Anderson). The Jay Treaty is discussed in Currie, The Federalist Period at 209-17 (cited in note 2). For another reprise of the arguments over that treaty, see the extensive but unrewarding debates on a bill to implement a treaty with Great Britain by repealing discriminatory duties, 29 Annals of Cong 46-89,160-61,454-674 (Jan 18,1816; Feb 27,1816; Jan 4-15,1816) . This treaty appears at 8 Stat 228 (July 3,1815) , the statute at 3 Stat 255 (Mar 1,1816) .
The statute establishing (East) Florida as a territory appears at 3 Stat 654 (Mar 30,1822) . 22 Annals of Cong 25-26 (Dec 18,1810) . Id at 37-42. This had been the Government's position from the beginning. See Letter from Robert Livingston to James Madison (May 20,1803) , in Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 2 American State Papers at 560-61 (cited in note 9); Letter from Robert Livingston and James Monroe to James Madison (June 7, 1803) , in Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 2 American State Papers at 563-65; Letter from James Madison to Robert Livingston and James Monroe (Mar 31, 1804) , in Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 2 American State Papers at 575-78.
22 Annals of Cong 49-53 (Dec 28, 1810) (arguing, among other things, that France had ceded West Florida to Great Britain before transferring Louisiana to Spain, and that after 1783 the Spanish had governed Louisiana and West Florida as separate provinces).
Clay, recently returned for a second short stint as Senator from Kentucky, supported it in impressive detail.
Independent of the question of sovereignty, Horsey argued that Madison had acted unconstitutionally in authorizing the occupation of West Florida, in annexing it to the Orleans Territory, and in subjecting it to territorial laws. Military occupation was war, and the rest was legislation; " [T] he Constitution has given to Congress the exclusive power of making laws and declaring war. ' Clay rose to the President's defense. Congress in 1803 had provided for occupation of the entire territory acquired from France. The next year it had defined the Orleans Territory broadly enough to inlude West Florida and authorized the establishment of a customs district there." These Acts "furnish[ed] a legislative construction of the treaty" consistent with that adopted by Madison in his proclamation." Moreover, the President was merely executing laws enacted by Congress, and "he would have violated that provision which requires him to see that the laws are faithfully executed, if he had longer forborne to act." '" Horsey argued that the 1803 law had exhausted its purpose when Louisiana proper was occupied and that it had expired in 1804. For the Act setting up a temporary territorial government had provided that the earlier statute would continue in effect only until October 1804.3 Not so, Clay retorted. What the territorial law did was to extend the 1803 Act until 1804 despite any contrary language in its provisions. The clear import was to continue the provisional government set up by the President, initially programmed to go out of business when Congress adjourned, until the new government could be set up; the separate section authorizing occupation of the ceded territory was unaffected. 33
Id at 56-61 (quoting a 1712 French grant defining Louisiana to include everything from Carolina to Mexico and insisting that Spanish commandants in West Florida had been subject to the Governor of Louisiana).
Id at 44-45. The Mobile Act, wrote Henry Adams, "actually annexed by statute the whole coast of Florida on the Gulf" and "indirectly authorized" the President to make war. Henry Adams, John Randolph 86 (Houghton, Mifflin 1898). 
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The University of Chicago Law Review
Historians have not dealt kindly with Madison and Jefferson's argument that West Florida was a part of the Louisiana Purchase." Whether it was turns on the interpretation of ancient French and Spanish law, and there is no point in trying to resolve the question here.' It may be, as Clay's biographer argued, that from the standpoint of the law of nations the seizure of West Florida was "a barefaced steal."' But that does not make it also an infraction of the Constitution. For the law of nations does not limit congressional power. 3 So far as domestic law is concerned, Congress may repeal a treaty even if in so doing it places the country in breach of its obligations to other nations, and it may declare an unjust war. 8 If the statutes Clay cited made West Florida part of the Orleans Territory and empowered the President to seize it, he was usurping authority neither to legislate nor to declare war.
There was ample room for disagreement with Clay's interpretation of the relevant statutes. There was ample room for concern lest loose construction of authorizing legislation enable Presidents effectively to make war without congressional approval. The later observer is uncomfortably reminded of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the war in Vietnam. ' Van Deusen, Life of Henry Clay at 62 (cited in note 10). "Napoleon himself," cried Henry Adams, "never committed a more arbitrary act than that of marching an army, without notice, into a neighbor's territory, on the plea that he claimed it as his own." Adams, History of the United States during Madison at 216 (cited in note 10).
. Compare Ware v Hylton, 3 US 199,223 (1796) Cong 2011 Cong -12,2073 Cong -74, and 2077 Cong -80 (1818 
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The University of Chicago Law Review Writing to Jackson, President Monroe was equally severe. The law of nations allowed the Army to pursue the Seminoles into Florida, but the General had exceeded his orders. To attack Spanish forts was an act of war to which the President himself was incompetent; to retain them would amount to a declaration of war that only Congress could make." Rethink your excuses, wrote the President, and we'll defend you; disgorge your booty and come home.48
The Spanish posts were returned, 9 and war was avoided. Jackson's enemies in Congress, however, were not so easily appeased.
When Congress met in November 1818, Monroe made a full report of Jackson's adventures. Authorized to pursue the Indians into Florida, he had discovered that local Spanish officials were encouraging the wrongdoers and had taken the Spanish posts in order to stop them. He had been instructed to give them back, as only Congress could declare war.
Three weeks later Representative Thomas Cobb of Georgia moved that the House appoint a committee to inquire whether the This point had been pressed upon the impetuous general a year and a half before. Reacting to a subordinate's threat to use force to liberate Americans imprisoned in Pensacola, the War Department stressed Jackson's duty to bring him to heel:
It is a matter of much surprise that, that officer should, for a moment, contemplate the commission of such an act of retaliatory warfare, as would place the country in a state of actual hostility with a foreign nation, to which the power of Congress only is competent. Letter from George Graham to Andrew Jackson (Nov 5,1816) fore the fur stopped flying.
Virginia's Edward Colston put the case very simply:
The power of declaring war had, for the wisest reasons, been confided, by the framers of the Constitution, to Congress; and yet we have seen the province of a nation, with whom we were at peace, invaded; her fortresses besieged and stormed; her towns taken; the blood of her citizens shed; her Government subverted; her laws abrogated; the civil power usurped, and those soldiers who had been placed there to preserve her authority and enforce her laws, sent off from the province they were intended to defend, and all this without any act of Congress to warrant it.
"If these were not acts of war," Colston continued,
he knew not what were; and yet, as he before observed, Congress had not been consulted. He had no hesitation in saying, that this was the most flagrant and palpable violation of the Constitution-the most violent encroachment upon the rights of this House, which had ever occurred in this country .... Occasional voices were raised to declare the inquiry out of order; they were shouted down, with good reason.n Of greater interest were the efforts to defend General Jackson's actions.
There were three arguments to support Monroe's order unleashing Jackson to invade Florida, and George Poindexter of Mississippi made all of them. Since the Seminoles had attacked first, the action was purely defensive and required no declaration of war. Moreover, Indian tribes were not foreign nations, so no declaration was required " 33 Annals of Cong 369-70 (Dec 8,1818 ).
Id at 825. Some years later, in a letter attacking Jackson as "not fitted for the office of first magistrate," Gallatin endorsed this analysis: In capturing Pensacola and in giving contingent orders to seize St. Augustine as well, Jackson had assumed "the power of making war against a foreign nation"-though the executive neither had authorized his actions nor could have done so "without a special previous Act of Congress." Letter from Albert Gallatin to Walter Lowrie (May 22,1824) [67:1 even to attack them. Finally, Congress had approved the campaign by appropriating funds to support it. 5 It was true that neither the General nor the President could initiate war against Spain, but neither had done so; occupation of the Spanish forts was a necessary incident of suppressing the offending Indians."
Other speakers elaborated repeatedly on the same themes. In the end the House voted down Cobb's proposals to censure Jackson and to forbid the entry of troops onto foreign soil except pursuant to legislative authorization or in "fresh pursuit" of the enemy.5
A Senate committee was less charitable. In raising volunteers without statutory authorization, wrote Senator Lacock, Jackson had usurped Congress's exclusive authority to raise armies; in seizing Pensacola and its fort he had usurped Congress's power to initiate war.
As in the case of Madison's foray into West Florida, there was a respectable argument that in the Seminole War Jackson crossed the line that separates legitimate from illegitimate executive action. Indians had been treated as nations for purposes of the treaty power," and President Washington had said he could not make war on them without congressional authorization.0 In voting appropriations for Jackson's troops Congress gave no indication that it meant to enable him to capture Spanish towns or forts, and doing so was a far cry from the original purpose of pursuing the Seminole marauders. On the other hand, there was a plausible argument that the entire action was a justifiable defensive measure. If Spain had attacked the United States, Representative Cobb conceded, no declaration of war would have been required to permit a response.6 ' As defenders of the expedition observed, Congress had authorized the President to employ both the militia and the army to repel invasions, and the entire operation was a response to foreign attack. Following the Indians into Florida was consistent with the law of nations and thus was not an act of war; even the seizure of Spanish posts was arguably justified as a further act of legitimate self-defense. Only retaining Spanish possessions, Monroe argued, would clearly be an act of war; and the President had ordered them returned.
Whoever was right on the facts, there was widespread agreement on the applicable rules of law. As Commander in Chief the President could repel invasions, as Congress had authorized him to do. Spain's breach of its treaty obligation to restrain the Indians, which Cobb conceded would justify Congress in declaring war, would not justify Executive retaliation against Spain; 2 Representative Holmes of Massachusetts, who defended Jackson's actions, conceded that breach of the treaty did not itself constitute war.6 3 Most important, as in the West Florida incident, both the President and his supporters agreed that he had no right to initiate hostilities against a foreign nation. As Monroe told Congress, only the legislature had a right to do that.' To the impetuous General Jackson he was even more explicit:
[A]n order by the government to attack a Spanish post ... would authorize war, to which, by the principles of the Constitution, the Executive is incompetent .... If the Executive refused to evacuate the posts,.., it would amount to a declaration of war .... It would be accused of usurping the authority of Congress, and giving a deep and fatal wound to the Constitution.... The last imputation to which I would consent justly to expose myself is that of infringing a Constitution to the support of which, on pure principles, my public life has been devoted.6 These are not the words of an officer insensitive to the limits of his constitutional authority. 
III. OUR SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS
As early as 1808 colonists in Spanish America had begun to revolt against their masters. Their struggles for independence raised a series of important issues respecting the boundaries between executive and legislative powers in the field of military and foreign affairs. 8
A. Recognition
Sympathetic from the start to the emerging new states south of the border, Presidents from Jefferson to Monroe were reluctant to recognize their sovereignty lest by premature action they provoke European intervention. 6' In 1817, eager to ascertain the strength of the new regimes, Monroe resolved to send a fact-finding commission to
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South America and asked Congress for $30,000 to pay its expenses.
For Henry Clay, now Speaker of the House and self-appointed champion of Latin American independence, this was not enough. He moved, as the reporter paraphrased it, that Congress appropriate $18,000 "as the outfit and one year's salary of a Minister to be de- 42-46, 55, 82-84, 195-96, 209-11, 274, 328-29 (cited in note 66 puted from the United States to the independent provinces of the Rio de la Plata, in South America." ' Appointing a minister meant recognizing independence, and that was Clay's intention. 2 7 But recognition was a matter for the President, Samuel Smith protested, not for Congress:
The Constitution has given to Congress legislative powers-to the President the direction of our intercourse with foreign nations. It is not wise for us to interfere with his powers .... Each branch had better confine itself to the duties assigned it by the Constitution.'
Alexander Smyth of Virginia spelled out the constitutional argument against Clay's proposal:
The Constitution ... grants to the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, power to appoint Ambassadors and public Ministers, and to make treaties. According to the usage of the Government, it is the President who receives all foreign Ministers, and determines what foreign Ministers shall or shall not be received. It is by the exercise of one of these powers, in neither of which has this House any participation, that a foreign Power must be acknowledged. Then the acknowledgment of the independence of a new Power is an exercise of Executive authority; consequently, for Congress to direct the Executive how he shall exercise this power, is an act of usurpation.7
Clay had anticipated this objection. Yes, it was for the President to depute and receive ministers, but it was for Congress to vote the salaries of those whom he elected to send. Thus Congress had "a concurrent will" in the matter of recognition. It was immaterial whether appropriations were made before or after a minister was appointed; in either case each branch would act as it saw fit in the exercise of its own constitutional responsibility.n Indeed, if (contrary to his opinion) recognition of the revolutionary government would create a risk of war, that was another reason for congressional action. For the Constitution gave Congress, not the President, the power to declare war, and no step that might lead to war should be taken "without a previous knowledge of the will of the war-making branch." 7 4 Representative Tucker was even more emphatic: "The act of the Executive here might have the effect of a declaration of war, which it is within the Constitutional powers of the Legislative body alone to make." 5 Moreover, said Clay, Congress had "the incontestable right to recognise a foreign nation, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations":
Suppose, for example, we passed an act to regulate trade between the United States and Buenos Ayres; the existence of the nation would be thereby recognized-as we could not regulate trade 76 with a nation which does not exist.
Finally, Tucker added, " [t] his House has at all times, and on all subjects, a right to declare its opinions, leaving to the Executive to act upon them or not, according to its pleasure."
Clay's proposal was soundly defeated, but it is by no means clear that all who voted against it believed it unconstitutional; there was much debate on the merits of immediate recognition as well.7' Three years later, after a more cursory reprise of the debate, the House adopted Clay's resolution in somewhat altered form: Whenever the " 32 Annals of Cong 1498-99, 1607-09 (Mar 25, 1818; Mar 28, 1818) (citing instances in which, he asserted, money had previously been appropriated for diplomatic appointments or treaties without prior presidential action or request). 
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President decided to recognize the new governments, the House would support him.
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As the Buenos Ayres regime became more stable and European intervention seemed less likely, recognition became a more imminent option, and Cabinet discussion turned to the question of how it should be accomplished.n William H. Crawford, now Secretary of the Treasury, urged that it be done "not by granting an 'exequatur' to a Consul, but by sending a Minister there; because the Senate must then act upon the nomination, which would give their sanction to the measure." 8' Attorney General William Wirt added with apparent approval that in that event "the House of Representatives must also concur by assenting to an Act of appropriation. '' n Adams vigorously disagreed:
[I]nstead of admitting the Senate or House of Representatives to any share in the act of recognition, I would expressly avoid that form of doing it which would require the concurrence of these bodies. It was, I had no doubt, by our Constitution, an act of the Executive authority. General Washington had exercised it in recognizing the French Republic by the reception of Mr. Genest [sic] . Mr. Madison had exercised it by declining several years to receive, and by finally receiving, Mr. Onis; and in this instance I thought the Executive ought carefully to preserve entire the authority given him by the Constitution, and not weaken it by setting the precedent of making either House of Congress a party to an act which it was his exclusive right and duty to perform.3 It was not until 1822 that Monroe was ready to take action. When he did it was to invite congressional participation in the decision, as he had urged all along:
When we regard ... the great length of time which this war [of independence] has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the Provinces, the present condition of the parties, and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled, and that the Provinces which have declared their independence and are in enjoyment of it ought to be recognized.... [67:1
Rumors of Wars
Should Congress concur in the view herein presented, they will doubtless see the propriety of making the necessary appropriations for carrying it into effect. 5
Congress appropriated the money, thus giving the legislative approval that Monroe desired but did not say the Constitution required. 60) . The appointment of ministers was delayed by yet another dispute over the permissibility of recess appointments to new offices, prompting Adams to conclude that "the words of the Constitution were against the exercise of the power; the reason of the words is in its favor." Id at 24-26.
Smith and Nelson had made this point during the debates on Clay's motion. Indeed the argument that recognition is implicit in various presidential powers applies as readily to the legislative powers to appropriate money and to regulate commerce; perhaps this is another case in which the President and Congress have overlapping authority. 9 '
One is tempted to resist this conclusion. As Alexander Smyth argued, it is essential that the nation speak with a single voice in foreign affairs.
9 2 Washington had made this point in insisting that Congress convey its congratulations to the French revolutionary government not directly but through him. There seems little reason to doubt Adams and Monroe's assessment that Clay's purpose was to embarrass the Administration and to force the President's hand."' That the appropriation power was intended as a check on presidential authorityiS does not prove it can be used to compel the President to take action he has discretion to decline; the purpose of the provision is to protect the public purse. It is arguable that the grants of executive authority to appoint and receive diplomats and to make treaties limit the power that might otherwise be implicit in the Commerce Clause-which, it should be added, did not provide a basis for Clay's proposed appropriation. President Washington was persuaded, however, not to deny the legislature's right to express its approval of the French constitution, so long as it did so through proper channels. Despite the anguished cries of Clay's opponents, the Speaker did not in the end propose to require President Monroe to recognize the government at Buenos Ayres. He [6'7: 1 
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Rumors of Wars made clear more than once that he expected the President to use his own judgment in deciding whether to take action;9 and after haranguing the chamber for several hours he moved only that funds be made available to be used "whenever the President shall deem it expedient to send a Minister to the said United Provinces."9
Maybe Congress could not recognize Buenos Ayres on its own, and maybe it could not order the President to do so.% But it takes a pretty ferocious view of presidential predominance in foreign affairs to deny Congress the power to appropriate money in case the President chooses to exercise his authority.9
B. The Arms Race
Before President Monroe decided it was time to recognize revolutionary governments in Latin America, he had been confronted with a request to provide arms to the rebels. In the recognition controversy the principal question was whether Congress was treading on the President's prerogatives. With the arms request it was the other way around. Although in the nature of the case the President must be the organ of communication with foreign governments, Congress or the Senate has often shown a disposition to share his responsibility or to inform him as to what in their belief should be done, whether in recognizing a new state or changes in the government of an established state .... Of course, it is entirely within the President's discretion whether he will accept the advice and comply with the request conveyed by such resolutions .... In March 1820, Adams recorded in his diary, President Monroe presented to his Cabinet the proposal of Manuel Torres, later to be received as the first representative of the new governments in Washington, "that the Government should sell upon credit to the Republic of Colombia any number short of twenty thousand stand of arms, to enable them to extend the South American Revolution into Peru and Mexico."' ' 0 It was a preview of the famous Lend-Lease deal that President Roosevelt concluded on the eve of United States participation in World War II, and it potentially raised the same three questions. Where did the President get authority to enter into such an arrangement? Was Senate consent required because the proposed agreement constituted a treaty within the meaning of Article II? And would a transfer of arms to belligerents infringe Congress's authority to declare war?'°N othing was said in 1820 about the role of the Senate, presumably because not every contract with purported representatives of a foreign government rises to the level of a treaty within Article ][.'0 Crawford and Calhoun did debate the question "whether the Executive could sell at all, without a special authority from Congress, arms belonging to the public." Calhoun cited a precedent in which gunpowder had been provided to the same rebels without statutory authorization, but Adams reported no argument either way on the merits. Article II makes the President Commander in Chief of the armed forces, but it is Congress to whom Article IV confides power to "dispose of property belonging to the United States."' 0' Arguably this latter provision, like Congress's power to raise and support armies as construed by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case, limits what otherwise might have been the authority of the Commander in Chie' 0 It was Adams himself who raised the decisive objections both of constitutionality and of policy:
I said there was no hesitation in my mind. To supply the arms professedly for the purpose set forth in the memorial of Torres would be a direct departure from neutrality, an act of absolute hostility to Spain, for which the Executive was not competent, by [67:1 the Constitution, without the authority of Congress.... It would, in my opinion, be not only an act of war, but of wrongful and dishonorable war, committed in the midst of professions of neutrality. It would also be as impolitic as wrongful and unconstitutional.
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Adams's observations proved fatal to Torres's proposal. Crawford agreed it would be impolitic to sell arms without congressional approval; Calhoun agreed it would be unconstitutional. "The decision was unanimous that the proposal could not be complied with, and I am to answer Mr. Torres accordingly."'7 Adams's constitutional objection provided a convenient excuse for refusing a request the Cabinet thought it inexpedient to grant. But it also rang true in its own terms. It was the latest in a long succession of narrow executive interpretations of executive war powers, in line with Monroe's own statements in the Seminole controversy and the arguments of his predecessors respecting aggressive actions against the Georgia Indians, the Barbary pirates, and the Spanish in West Florida. But Adams's argument went even further. Not only was the President forbidden to initiate hostilities himself; he could do nothing that would give a potential adversary just cause for war. That was what Clay had said in the House during the recognition debate in 1818; ' *0 it was perhaps as restrictive a construction as had ever been given to the authority of the Commander in Chief.
C. The Monroe Doctrine
Having begun to recognize revolutionary Latin American governments in 1822, President Monroe proceeded the following year to offer them protection against European interference:
The political system of the allied powers is essentially different ... from that of America.... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose Adams, ed, 5 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams at 46 (cited in note 100). "Id at 47.
Because he was convinced that mere recognition would not be cause for war, Clay had conceded the President's power to declare it. But he had insisted that aid to the rebels, even without recognition, would give Spain just cause for war. 32 Annals of Cong 1487 (Mar 25,1818).
independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United
States."
Earlier in the same speech Monroe had rounded out this threat by proclaiming "that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."" 0
The Monroe's pronouncement was well received in the United States."' Virtually no one questioned it at the time. Yet it posed a constitutional difficulty of the first importance.
In 1793, when President Washington proclaimed American neutrality in the wars growing out of the French Revolution, partisans of [67:1
In terms of the policy underlying the constitutional provision the public response to these two events was precisely backwards. The reason for giving Congress power to declare war was to keep the country out of hostilities without popular approval. Washington's action was fully in accord with this principle, for its thrust was to prevent an undeclared war. Monroe's threat was the opposite: It seemed to commit the nation to a war that Congress had never declared.
Of course Monroe neither declared war nor initiated hostilities against any nation in his 1823 speech. Nor did he so plainly risk war by giving other nations just cause for military action as he would have by selling arms to South American rebels or even, arguably, by unilaterally recognizing the revolutionary governments. And of course, as Adams emphasized, the President could not commit the country to fight for South America even if he tried, since only Congress could declare war."-Nor did he really profess to do so. To warn that intervention would be a "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition" and "dangerous to our peace and safety" was only to say we would not take kindly to it; it was not to promise that we would respond by going to war."' That said, Monroe's speech remains a highly belligerent utterance that risked war in two ways and thus significantly increased the risk that the decision might be taken out of congressional hands. First, like the recognition or provisioning of rebel governments, even a veiled threat of military support for them might be viewed by European powers as a hostile act justifying military action against the United One of the questions Monroe posed to his Cabinet for discussion in 1817 was whether sending a minister to a new state unacknowledged by its parent country would give that nation "a justifiable cause of war." Hamilton, ed, 6 The Writings of James Monroe at 31 (cited in note 48). See also the arguments of Representatives Clay and Tucker described above in text accompanying notes 74 and 75. The declaration of the late President ... must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand. When the case shall arrive, if it should ever occur, of such an European interference as the message supposes, and it becomes consequently necessary to decide whether this country will or will not engage in war, Congress alone, you well know, is competent, by our Constitution, to decide that question. In the event of such an interference, there can be but little doubt that the sentiment contained in President Monroe's message, would still be that of the People and Government of the United States. States. Of course one of the hopes in making the declaration was that it might deter European intervention by increasing its costs to the invading parties.' Yet there was always the risk that it might backfire and divert European aggressions against the United States.
Second, while the declaration left Congress legally free not to respond to intervention by declaring war, as a practical matter it severely limited the legislature's freedom of action. There would be great quantities of egg on the nation's collective face if, after such a pompous boast, it allowed Spain or France to suppress South American independence without a fight. Congress would be under enormous pressure not to permit such a humiliating blow to the credibility and prestige of the United States. It would no longer be a free agent in deciding whether or not to go to war. Although Adams acknowledged the desirability of obtaining congressional support for the President's policy, the Administration did nothing to obtain it-at least in part because, as Adams noted in his diary, to do so would have required it to divulge communications it had promised to keep confidential 1 a Speaker Clay proposed just such a resolution in the House, 2 ' but it was neither voted on nor discussed; for it was appended to a doomed proposal to appropriate money to send a diplomatic agent to the revolutionary government in Greece.i See Adams, ed, 6 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams at 206,208 (cited in note 60); Whitaker,
The Independence of Latin America at 512 (cited in note 66).
-Attorney General William Wirt, the only Cabinet member to express doubts about promulgation of the Doctrine, thought the country would be unwilling to go to war to protect Latin American independence and agreed it would be bad for the United States to make a threat and not live up to it: "To menace without intending to strike was neither consistent with the honor nor the dignity of the country." Adams, ed, 6 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams at 205 (cited in note 60). Adams himselt responding to Wirt's concern, noted that if it were practicable he would wish for a joint resolution of both Houses in support of the President's position. Id at 202. Id. One is reminded again of President Roosevelt's vigorous efforts to shoehorn the United States into World War II.
" Id. Since a warning such as the President meant to deliver "may lead to war, the declaration of which requires an act of Congress," Jefferson advised him, "the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting .... Resolved, that provision ought to be made, by law, for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an agent, or commissioner, to Greece, whenever the President shall deem it The Greek proposal raised all the questions of interference with executive prerogative ' n that had attended Clay's parallel suggestion involving South America five years before.24 It also contradicted the third principle of Monroe's famous address, which reaffirmed the nation's longstanding reluctance to involve itself in European affairs.n After enduring several days of concentrated attack the Greek resolution vanished without a trace, and that was the last of reported legislative response to the Monroe Doctrine in the Congress to which it was announced. 2 6
Thus if the President's proclamation trampled upon congressional territory, Congress at the time seemed unconcerned.'2 No sooner had the popular Monroe left the Presidency, however, than Members of Congress began to find fault with his position, though usually without criticizing him by name. His hapless successor was to reap the blame for a policy the two had hammered out together" and for which Monroe himself had received most of the praise. states in the process of selection by the House when no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes.2 9 Supporters of his assorted opponents missed few opportunities to obstruct or embarrass the new Administration, not least in the field of foreign affairs.'3 0
In his very first communication to Congress, in December 1825, President Adams disclosed that several of the new Latin American nations had determined to hold a "congress" in Panama "to deliberate upon objects important to the welfare of all." They had invited the United States to participate. "The invitation has been accepted," said the President, "and ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations, and to take part in them so far as may be compatible with that neutrality from which it is neither our intention nor the desire of the other American States that we should depart."3 ' ' Three weeks later the President expanded on this message. He appeared to bend over backward in his desire to indicate that in accepting the invitation he had intended no slight to the interests of the House or Senate:
Although this measure was deemed to be within the constitutional competency of the Executive, I have not thought it proper to take any step in it before ascertaining that my opinion of its expediency will concur with that of both branches of the Legislature, first, by the decision of the Senate upon the nominations to be laid before them, and, secondly, by the sanction of both Houses to the appropriations, without which it can not be carried into effect.n He went on to specify in some detail the advantages of U.S. participation in the projected assembly. New nations might be talked out of discriminatory trade regulations and into a joint policy of respect for neutral shipping; they might be persuaded to promote religious liberty; they might be egged on to terminate their continuing squabbles and abandon any associated schemes detrimental to the United States.
Above all, the conference might serve to cement U.S. friendship (and influence, which he did not have to mention) with the new nations of Latin America: "[A] decisive inducement with me for acceding to the measure is to show by this token of respect to the southern Republics the interest that we take in their welfare and our disposition to comply with their wishes."'3 The message concluded by requesting Senate consent to the appointment of two "envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the assembly of American nations at Panama," and of a third individual as "secretary to the mission.
' M Improbable as it seems, this sensible proposition generated a storm of assaults on the Administration, a number of which were based on the Constitution.
The first blow was struck by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in a report made by Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, one-time Speaker of the House and a Republican of the old school. In passing on nominations for offices that had never been filled or authorized by statute, he said, it was the Senate's responsibility to evaluate not only the fitness of the candidates but also the expediency of their mission; and it was inexpedient for the United States to participate in the Panama Congress. Both the objects of that assembly and the powers of its members were undefined; the topics of discussion suggested by the President were either improper or could be better pursued elsewhere; other participants had said their principal purpose was to conclude a defensive alliance that it would be improper for the United States to join. The entire enterprise, the report concluded, was inconsistent with the longstanding policy of avoiding entanglement in other nations' affairs, and the nominations should not be approved.
From the constitutional perspective there was nothing wrong with this report. Macon might be benighted and provincial in his approach to foreign affairs, but that was his prerogative. He was right that the requirement of Senate consent was intended as a check on presidential appointments, and the Senate had long employed it to test not only the qualifications of diplomatic appointees but the desirability of making any appointments at all.L Taking the floor to defend Macon's report, Senator Robert Hayne of South Carolina-soon to become famous for his celebrated exchanges with Webster over the protective tariff-argued that the objects of the Panama Congress were "essentially belligerent," and that participation by the United States would be a departure from neutrality that would give European states cause for war.Ln Moreover, a principal purpose of the assembly, Hayne asserted, was to induce the United States to enter into treaties to redeem "the pledge which Mr. Monroe is supposed to have given, 'not to permit any foreign power to interfere in the war between Spain and her colonies. In President Monroe, said Senator Hayne, had made no such pledge. President Monroe had had no right to do so. In warning that the United States would view European interference as "dangerous" and "unfriendly" he had left the nation "free to act in any emergency according to circumstances and a sense of our own interests." Monroe's declaration had created "no obligation to others," but apparently the new nations had perceived one. Worst of all, "the new Administration" appeared to have acknowledged their claims. For Joel Poinsett, U.S. Minister to Mexico, had assured the Mexican government that "the United States had pledged themselves not to permit any other power to interfere either with their independence or form of Government."' 39 Furthermore, the new Secretary of State (who was none other than the fire-breathing Henry Clay) had announced that the United States would permit the conquest of Cuba by Mexico or Colombia but would not allow Spain to transfer that island to any other European power.'Q As all of this was bad policy, Hayne continued, the Senate ought not to approve participation in a congress that was designed to confirm it.'' More important for present purposes, he added that in attempting to commit the United States on these matters the Adams Administration had exceeded its constitutional powers:
rejected the nomination of Jonathan Russell on the ground that "it is inexpedient, at this time, to send a Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden." 26 Annals of Cong 97-98 (June 24, 1813). The House had asserted the same authority in passing upon appropriations to pay diplomatic salaries. See Currie, The Federalist Period at 45 n 267,218 n 93 (cited in note 2).
2 Register of Debates in Congress 152-57 (Gales and Seaton 1826). Id at 161. Id at 162. Yes, Mr. Poinsett was also an amateur botanist, to whom we are indebted every winter when we bedeck our homes with large red or white flowers-which are really, as everyone knows nothing but misguided leaves. See J. Fred Rippy, Joel Roberts Poinselt, Versatile American 205 (Greenwood 1968) (first published in 1935) ; "Poinsetta" in 9 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 545 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 15th ed 1998).
Register of Debates in Congress at 168 (cited in note 137).
Id at 164,169.
The true Constitutional ground is, that the President has no right to pledge this nation, either as to our not permitting any foreign nation to take Cuba, or as to there being no ground to interfere to prevent its capture by the new Republics."* And thus the debate over the Panama Congress became yet another debate on the respective powers of the President and of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.
Before he sat down, Hayne took an additional pot shot at the President. In his initial message Adams, in announcing his acceptance of the invitation to Panama, had imperiously declared that ministers would be commissioned to attend; only later had he said anything of requesting Senate consent to their appointment, and even then he had insisted that he had the right to act on his own. But these ministers were not mere "private agents" like those Monroe had sent to gather information before proposing to recognize the new republics; the fact that they were to be "commissioned" demonstrated that they were officers of the United States whose appointment was governed by Article II. That meant they could not be appointed, in the absence of statute, without Senate approval. ' 4 3 Thus Hayne contrived to inject two major constitutional issues into the Panama debate: the President's power to commit the nation to military action and the scope of the Senate's right to pass upon nominations to federal office.
After much haggling the Senate confirmed the appointments, and Congress appropriated the funds to support their mission." The Senate spent the better part of a week debating a separate motion to adopt Hayne's position that the President lacked authority to appoint ministers without Senate consent. Additional constitutional objections were ventilated in the course of these tiresome proceedings. The President could not make recess appointments to new diplomatic positions, because no vacancy had "happen[ed]" during the recess.'4 He could not create the offices in question by making appointments, even with Senate consent, because diplomats not accredited to any particular country were not "ambassadors and other public ministers" within the meaning of Article IL.'4 7 Most significantly, in the words of New York Senator Martin Van Buren, not even Congress itself could authorize the Government to participate in the Panama Congress. For that Congress was no mere diplomatic meeting to discuss common concerns. A line-by-line comparison of its charter with the Articles of Confederation, Senator Benton argued, exposed the Panama Congress as the "Congress of Deputies" of a new Pan-American confederacy."s Such a body was "unknown to the Constitution," and the United States could not be a party to it."" For as Van Buren's proposed resolution proclaimed, the power of forming or entering, (in any manner whatever), into new political associations, or confederacies, belongs to the People of the United States, in their sovereign character, being one of the powers which, not having been delegated to the Government, is reserved to the States or People .... '
The arguments about recess appointments and agents who were not "officers" were not new, and nothing new was offered to support or refute them. The argument that "ministers" could be appointed only to particular countries had little to recommend it in light of the apparent purpose of the appointment provision; the nation may need representatives to international assemblies as well as to individual states.
The argument against participating in the Congress at all was more arresting and of greater import for the future. It would emerge again 120 years later in opposition to joining the United Nations. Moreover, as an abstract proposition there was a good deal to be said for it. Nowhere in the Constitution was Congress, let alone the Presi-dent, given express or implied authority to transfer sovereign powers to an international body. " However, it was pure fantasy to suppose that sending ministers to Panama would have any such effect. Even Benton's painstaking parsing of the treaties that laid the ground rules for the Congress revealed that its "deputies" were to have none of the powers that had made the Continental Congress a governmental assembly, and the relevant texts expressly denied that the "compact of union, league, and Confederation" they aimed to establish would limit the sovereignty of its adherents in any way.M More important, the United States was not a party to these treaties, and it should have been obvious from President Adams's earlier statements that, as he made crystal clear after Van Buren's motion had been defeated, the ministers would have authority only to talk: I can scarcely deem it otherwise than superfluous to observe that the assembly will be in its nature diplomatic and not legislative; that nothing can be transacted there obligatory upon any one of the States to be represented at the meeting, unless with the express concurrence of its own representatives, nor even then, but subject to the ratification of its constitutional authority at home. The faith of the United States to foreign powers can not otherwise be pledged. I shall, indeed, in the first instance, consider the assembly as merely consultative; and although the plenipotentiaries of the United States will be empowered to receive and refer to the consideration of their Government any proposition from the other parties to the meeting, they will be authorized to conclude nothing unless subject to the definitive sanction of the Government in all its constitutional forms." 3 Jawboning, not the exercise of sovereign powers, was Adams's object in sending representatives to the Panama Congress. ' The most interesting contribution of the Panama debate to constitutional discourse was the additional light it shed on the legitimacy of the Monroe Doctrine.
Senator The carping continued, however, as the House proceeded to debate appropriations for the Panama assembly. Members on both sides of the present controversy leapt once again to Monroe's defense. He had made no pledge, they argued; he had merely expressed his own opinion, leaving it to Congress to carry through on his warning.
' 62
Daniel Webster, now representing Massachusetts in the House, argued that Monroe's pronouncement had been "wise, seasonable, and patriotic."' 6' It had "meant much," and it had "effected much good." It had done "great honor to the foresight and the spirit of the Government," and it had met with "the entire concurrence, and the hearty approbation of the country." There was no reason to attack it now, when the danger of European intervention was past.16
Nor, Webster continued, had the Adams Administration in any way altered the sense of Monroe's policy. If Mr. Poinsett had accurately reported his conversation with the Mexican minister, "he did go too far; farther than any instruction warranted." But Poinsett had set the matter straight by making clear "that this Government had given no pledge which others could call upon it to redeem"; he had "deceived nobody, nor has he committed the country."""
Webster did not mention the Constitution. Implicit in his argument, however, is the standard constitutional defense of the Monroe Doctrine. Of course the President had no authority to bind the United States to come to the defense of Latin America; only Congress could declare war. But neither Monroe nor his successor attempted to bind the United States. Nothing in the Constitution prevented them from warning the European powers that they risked war if they interfered with the independence of the new nations. In an earlier debate Webster with his usual eloquence had put the affirmative case for Monroe's declaration:
It must, of course, happen, in every Government, that the Executive should undertake to speak, towards foreign nations, of the wishes and objects of the Government. It cannot be otherwise. But this it does on its responsibility. General Washington proclaimed neutrality at the breaking out of the great European wars. But it was competent to the two Houses to present him a law, the next day, declaring war. The intercourse of nations could hardly go on, and one great end of an Executive would be defeated, if it could not venture, on proper occasions, to express the views and wishes of the Government ' 6
Maybe. Yet of all the presidential actions of this period, the Monroe Doctrine may be the most questionable in terms of executive encroachment on legislative authority. For by issuing his declaration the President claimed the right to threaten European nations with war if they intruded into Latin American affairs. Although he could not legally commit the country to intervene, he committed its honor and prestige, made it difficult for Congress not to carry out his threat, and thus created a serious risk of provoking a war he had no power to begin. In so doing it is arguable that he effectively interfered with Congress's authority to decide whether or not to declare war.167
Even in this instance, however, Monroe neither claimed the right to initiate hostilities nor committed an act of war. He had expressly denied any such right both in the Seminole controversy and in rejectId at 2270. 'Id at 1808. Apart from the question whether Monroe's declaration infringed Congress's war powers, affirmative authorization for it must of course be found in the Constitution. The most promising source is the implicit power over foreign affairs asserted by Hamilton in his defense of the Neutrality Proclamation and blessed by the Supreme Court in United States v Curtiss-Wright Corp, 299 US 304,315,319-20 (1936) . See Currie, The Federalist Period at 217-18 n 63 (cited in note 2). The respective powers of the President and Congress of the United States, in the case of war with foreign powers, are yet undetermined. Perhaps they can never be defined. The Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power of declaring war, and that act can of course never be performed by the President alone. But war is often made without being declared. War is a state in which nations are placed not alone by their own acts, but by the acts of other nations.... However startled we may be at the idea that the Executive Chief Magistrate has the power of involving the nation in war, even without consulting Congress, an experience of fifty years has proved that in numberless cases he has and must have exercised the power. In the case [of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation] ... the recognition of the French Republic and the reception of her minister might have been regarded by the allied powers as acts of hostility to them, and they did actually interdict all neutral commerce with France. Defensive war must necessarily be among the duties of the Executive Chief Magistrate. In several key situations, they selected aggressive agents, sympathetic to administration policy, issued unnecessarily vague instructions, failed to respond to letters indicating that constitutionally questionable actions were contemplated, and suppressed information that would have revealed their conduct. In this manner... [they] were able to encourage activities to be undertaken that exceeded the bounds of behavior by which they publicly purported to be governed, and to place responsibility for those activities upon others.
Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power at 379 (cited in note 41).
